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CY PRES POWERS OF THE FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY COURTS-NEW HOPE FOR
FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED CHARITIES?
George B. Reese*
I. Introduction
It is a hard reality that numerous eastern municipalities are in the
midst of financial crises.' At the same time, certain private charita-
ble institutions operating in urban areas face financial problems of
their own. In the past, these institutions-hospital7 community
service centers, and the like-were partially reimbursed by govern-
ment welfare funds for their "public services" expenditures.' But as
the pressures on municipal budgets have increased, these reim-
bursements have become delayed, and sometimes uncertain. Char-
itable institutions, like the municipalities in which they operate,
are now confronted with the task of maintaining normal operations
in the face of increasing debt burdens.
One possible solution, albeit a drastic one, is for such corporations
to reorganize in bankruptcy.3 Under the provisions of the Bank-
* B.A. Yale University; J.D. Columbia University School of Law. Member of the New York
Bar.
1. See generally Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy under the 1976 amendments to Chapter IX
of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1, 2-4 (1976); see also Note, The Limits of State
Intervention in a Municipal Fiscal Crisis, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 545 (1976).
2. In an earlier period when governmental services were meager, and in many cases
non-existent, public funds were used extensively to subsidize voluntary agencies ren-
dering needed services. In some instances, these payments were in the form of lump
sums, as a subsidy to help cover the cost of its operations, in others they were payments
for specific services rendered or for individuals receiving care .... There are of course
occasions for the purchase of services from voluntary agencies and institutions by the
government, but for most public services, the government relies and undoubtedly will
continue to rely on the governmental welfare agencies.
W. VASEY, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL WELFARE 92 (1965).
3. In 1973, New York's French and Polyclinic Hospital filed a petition seeking reorganiza-
tion under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The hospital had been formed in 1969 by the
merger of two of New York City's oldest voluntary hospitals, both dating back to the nine-
teenth century. On October 2, 1975, the bankruptcy court ordered the hospital shut down,
but subsequently stayed that order indefinitely. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1975, at 45, col.5. How-
ever, on March 8, 1977, the court ordered the hospital to close down permanently and liqui-
date its assets. In re French & Polyclinic Medical School & Health Center, Inc., No. 73 B
691 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1977).
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ruptcy Act (Act),' a court in bankruptcy may suspend a corpora-
tion's debt service, order current revenues to be applied in payment
of current expenses, and most importantly, grant the bankrupt cor-
poration time to realign its resources and reconsider its commit-
ments.5 In the past, however, the reorganization in bankruptcy of a
charitable corporation has been a rare event. These corporations'
tax-exempt status' formerly provided a strong bulwark against in-
solvency.7 But huge operating deficits, coupled with severe cash flow
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 29 (a) (1970), provides that the bankruptcy court may stay suits against
the bankrupt which are founded upon claims likely to be eradicated by a discharge in
bankruptcy. Chapter XI recognizes application of section 11, and confers upon the court
further power to stay other suits. 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970). The court, on notice and for cause
shown, may even stay proceedings to enforce liens on the debtor's property. In re Atlantic
Steel Products Corp., 31 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
6. Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code lists as exempt organizations:
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary,
or educational purposes, or for prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in
... any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
See also Sugarman and Pomeroy, Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 46 VA. L. Rv.
424 (1960). The Code also provides that gifts to certain designated charities are deductible
by the donor up to specified limits, usually 50 percent of the donor's gross income. I.R.C.
§ 170(b).
7. One commentator has noted that:
[T]he federal income tax laws by providing tax exemption and encouraging contribu-
tions to qualifying nonprofit health institutions, have an important effect on the opera-
tion and expansion of voluntary hospitals, homes for the aged and other health facili-
ties. On the other hand, the changing patterns of financing health care have an equally
important effect upon the laws which provide tax exemption for these institutions.
Bromberg, Financing Health Care and The Effect of the Tax Law, 39 LAW & CoNTrEMP. PROB.
156 (Autumn 1975). However, the same author also noted that present economic conditions
have rendered useless the traditional method of financing hospital operations:
In order to remain financially solvent, it is usually necessary for most hospitals to
attempt to operate at an excess of receipts over the sum of disbursements and historical
cost depreciation. Under cost reimbursement formulae, replacement and renovation of
assets is generally limited to reimbursement based on depreciation, with most "cost
plus" exceptions usually being inadequate in inflationary periods . . . . However, in
today's inflationary economy, this formula will obviously not be sufficient to enable
hospitals to replace assets at current prices. Thus, inflation, coupled with technological
advances which make needed replacements more complex and expensive, makes it
difficult for hospitals to rely on reimbursement for their future capital needs and
compels them to orient their operations towards realizing an excess of receipts over
disbursements just to operate.
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shortages, may so overwhelm available funds that bankruptcy, once
considered a legal oddity, will become a form of relief seriously
contemplated by a number of large charitable institutions.
Forced to conduct their interim operations with restricted fund-
ing, some institutions have increasingly looked to private endow-
ments to maintain services at adequate levels.' Yet such endow-
ments tend to be tied to all the hedges and restrictions that human
wisdom can devise or human vanity dictate. In present circum-
stances, such restrictions seem to cause a misallocation of precious
financial resources.
State law has long provided a means of removing restrictions-the
cy pres doctrine-when changing circumstances render them either
unreasonable or impossible to enforce? According to this doctrine,
a gift in trust or otherwise which is determined to have been made
pursuant to a general charitable intent will not fail under the
changed circumstances,"0 but instead will be judicially modified to
carry out, as nearly as possible, the donor's presumed wishes."
Id. at 157.
8. See, e.g., Inre Staten Island Hosp., N.Y.L.J., April 26, 1976, at9, col.4 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
The current problems of reduced resources and endowment are shared by many of the volun-
tary hospitals in the New York metropolitan area. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1973, at 46, col.
3.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959) describes the cy pres doctrine as follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitiable purpose, and it is
or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose,
and if the settlor manifested a more general intefition to devote the property to charita-
ble purpose, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the
property to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention
of the settlor.
No charitable organization may receive a gift made for one purpose and use it for another,
unless a court applying the cy pres doctrine so commands. In re Lawless' Will, 194 Misc.
844, 87 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sur. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 1045, 100 N.Y.S.2d 537 (2d Dep't
1950); Knickerbocker Hosp. v. Goldstein, 181 Misc. 540, 41 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct, 1943).
10. Reverter due to the failure of a trust's purposes would be unlikely in the case of a
charitable trust because of the possible application thereto of the cy pres doctrine. See
Hanover Bank v. The United Brethren's Church, 134 N.Y.S.2d 356, 360 (Sup. Ct. 1954). See
note 20 infra.
11. In most states, the cy pres doctrine has been codified. N.Y. EST., POWEaS & TRUSTS
LAw § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967) provides:
The supreme court and, where the disposition is made by will, the surrogate's court in
which such will is probated have jurisdiction over the dispositions referred to and
authorized by paragraphs (a) and (b) [charitable trusts], and whenever it appears to
such court that circumstances have so changed since the execution of an instrument
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A charitable corporation contemplating a petition in bankruptcy
might also wish to seek cy pres relief from the bankruptcy court.
However, the dearth of case law involving such bankruptcies has left
unclear whether the two proceedings could be combined-that is,
whether a bankruptcy court, as part of a plan of reorganizations,
could modify restrictions on charitable endowments in a fashion
similar to state cy pres relief. This Article will examine the nature
of the cy pres doctrine and the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
to determine whether the court may grant such relief to financially-
distressed charities.
II. Cy Pres Under State Law
When the terms of a charitable trust become impossible or
impractical to execute, the trustee must ask a court of competent
jurisdiction to apply the cy pres doctrine and reform the trust.' The
trustee has no authority to deviate from the trust provisions on his
own.'
3
The court's primary objective in a cy pres proceeding is to deter-
mine the intent of the trust creator." First, the court must ascertain
whether the creator intended to benefit a specific beneficiary or
simply a general class of persons. If specific charitable intent is
discerned, then cy pres may not be applied;' 5 but if the court con-
cludes that the creator whs motivated by a general charitable in-
making a disposition for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes as
to render impracticable or impossible a literal compliance with the terms of such
disposition, the court may, on application of the trustee or of the person having custody
of the property subject to the disposition and on such notice as the court may direct,
make an order or decree directing that such disposition be administered and applied
in such manner as in the judgment of the court will most effectively accomplish its
general purposes, free from any specific restriction, limitation or direction contained
therein; provided, however, that any such order or decree is effective only with the
consent of the creator of the disposition if he is living.
12. In re Koons' Will, 206 Misc. 856, 858, 135 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Knicker-
bocker Hosp. v. Goldstein, 181 Misc. 540, 543, 41 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34-35 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
13. See 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 391 (3d ed. 1967); see also In re Koons' Will, 206 Misc. 856,
858, 135 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Knickerbocker Hosp. v. Goldstein, 181 Misc. 540,
543, 41 N.Y.S.2d 32, 35 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
14. "In applying the doctrine of cy pres the courts endeavor to accomplish the general
charitable purpose of the testator 'as nearly as it can be conveniently done, consistently with
the efficacious promotion of the general design.'..." Town of Brookline v. Barnes, 327 Mass.
201, 208, 97 N.E.2d 651, 655 (1951), quoting American Acad. of Arts & Sciences v. President
of Harvard College, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 582, 589 (1832).
15. See 4 Scorr ON TRUSTS § 399 (3d ed. 1967).
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tent, the gift will be appropriately modified. 6 In In re Goehringer, 7
the testator left a large bequest to a preparatory school. Six months
after the testator's death, the trustees of the school voted to dissolve
the charitable corporation and close the school. 8 The court was
asked to apply the cy pres doctrine and did so according to the test
of intent: 9
In applying cy pres we must be mindful that courts have no more power to
make wills for the dead than contracts for the living. Therefore basic to that
determination is the intention of the testator. A broad generality is that the
cy pres doctrine . . . will be applied (though impossible to carry out fully
the testator's expressed desires) if from the will as a whole there may be
discerned a primary intention of the testator to devote his property to a
general charitable purpose rather than to give the gift to a particular charity
or for a particular purpose. Where the issue arises because of the nonexist-
ence, merger or dissolution of the charitable beneficiary, the test applied
is-if a general charitable purpose is primary and the particular beneficiary
is only secondary, cy pres will be applied. On the other hand if the particular
beneficiary is primary and the general charitable purpose only secondary
then cy pres will not be applied.
Applying this test, the court held that the testator's primary motive
was a general charitable intent and reformed the trust.20
16. In the usual course of affairs, courts tend to find charitable intent frequently. The
New York Court of Appeals has recognized the "liberality of the rules which the courts have
adopted in order to save charitable gifts by the application of cy pres." In re Syracuse Univ.,
3 N.Y.2d 665, 670, 148 N.E.2d 671, 673, 171 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547-48 (1958).
17. 69 Misc. 2d 145, 329 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sur. Ct. 1972).
18. Id. at 146, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 518. While this case technically involved a distribution of
assets following dissolution of a charitable corporation, the court indicated that the cy pres
doctrine was applicable to the proceeding. Id. at 147, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
19. Id. at 148, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 520 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 148-49, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 521. The court noted that:
The testator does not perhaps foresee the possible failure of his gift. But when he does,
he generally does not look ahead beyond the vesting of the gift. Up to the point of
vesting he may very well have an intention to benefit a particular institution. But all
institutions must ultimately fail, if not soon after vesting then decades later. Of course,
those dispositions which are outright gifts will have then been consumed. Those which
are in charitable trust . . . and not consumed will invariably be subjected to cy pres.
The reasons - this is what most testators probably intend should the gift fail long
after vesting: judicial policy favoring charitable gifts prompts courts to find a general
charitable intent.
Id. Onice a charitable disposition has vested, the cy pres doctrine will invariably be applied,
unless the creator has clearly evidenced an intent that a particular gift over has been in the
event of the failure of the bequest. In re Neher, 279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E.2d 625 (1939). In In re
Potter, 307 N.Y. 504, 121 N.E.2d 552 (1954), the trust creafor had left an amount in trust to
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Two recent cases demonstrate the liberality with which the cy
pres doctrine has come to be applied in New York State. In re Staten
Island Hospital2' was a proceeding brought by a private hospital, as
the income beneficiary of certain trust funds, seeking modification
of the trust. The hospital occupied a fifty-year-old building which,
due to overcrowded conditions and structural defects, was in viola-
tion of health and safety standards promulgated by the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. As a result,
federal payments to the hospital under Medicare were in jeopardy.
The hospital sought to obtain the trust principal and use it to erect
a new hospital building.
The court took note of the hospital's plight: failure to correct the
overcrowding and structural defects would make the hospital ineli-
gible for Medicare reimbursement, depriving the hospital of 38 per-
cent of its income." Repair of the structural faults would have cost
over two million dollars and would not have relieved the overcrowd-
ing; in short, "[i]f the new hospital facilities [were] not built, the
Staten Island Hospital [would have gone] out of existence." 3 Ex-
amining the trust instruments, the court concluded that the testa-
tors had expressed a general, rather than specific, charitable in-
tent:24
Circumstances have so changed since the execution of these wills that it is
no longer practicable to continue to use the income from these funds to
maintain the present facility and it will be impossible to use the income for
the benefit of the hospital if the hospital ceases to exist. The facts here
warrant the application of cy pres to carry out the general charitable intent
of the decedents and to prevent the failure of their definite charitable pur-
pose, the continued operations of the Staten Island Hospital.
Thus, the court preserved the specific beneficiary by carrying out
the testators' general intent, though not their specific instructions.
Public policy considerations can have a considerable influence on
a private school to be used for educating "the children of the poor." Id. at 509, 121 N.E.2d
at 523. More than a century after the gift vested, the school was merged into the public school
system. The trustee brought an action to compel a reverter of the funds, pursuant to a
provision of the trust. The court denied the application and applied the cy pres doctrine, on
the theory that the fund could still be used for the general purpose of educating the children
of the poor. Id. at 518, 121 N.E.2d at 529.
21. N.Y.L.J., April 26, 1976, at 9, col. 4 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
22. Id. at col. 5.
23. Id.
24. Id.
[Vol. V
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cy pres proceedings, as is shown by In re Samaritan Fund for the
Aged.25 In Samaritan Fund, a not-for-profit corporation petitioned
the New York Supreme Court for judicial approval of a plan of
dissolution. The fund was the beneficiary of certain trust assets
which were used to maintain and operate a home for indigent, aged
members of the Protestant faith; the restrictions on these assets
apparently were continued in the proposed plan of dissolution.
The court was dissatisfied with the proposed plan and appointed
a referee to develop a new distribution scheme. Under the referee's
proposal, adopted by the court, the trust funds specifically intended
to aid members of a particular religious group became available for
the care of the indigent aged in general."
Cy pres proceedings are fairly complex. In New York, the nature
of the trust determines the forum which will interpret and adminis-
ter it. Proper venue for testamentary trusts lies in the surrogate's
court that admitted the will to probate,27 while petitions regarding
inter vivos trusts are heard by the supreme court.2" Necessary par-
ties to all such proceedings include the State Attorney General,2" the
trustees" (if they are not the petitioning parties), the creator of the
trust3' (if he is still alive), and in the case of real property, the
25. N.Y.L.J., May 5, 1976, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
26. Id. The court in Samaritan Fund was obviously concerned with overcoming a restric-
tion it found repugnant and noted some of the factors it considered in deciding the disposition
of the trust principal:
In accordance with the original mandate, special attention as directed by the referee
to the admissions and employment policies and history of the proposed donee, in the
context of its geographic locale and surrounding population composition. An in-depth
study and review of relevant legal precedents and memoranda was necessarily under-
taken by him on this issue. Past and current records of the proposed donee were
meticulously examined. Among those heard on this question was the Supervising Com-
pliance Officer for the Civil Rights Compliance Unit of the New York State Depart-
ment of Health, the agency which is responsible for surveying skilled nursing and
health related facilities in the state for purposes of verifying compliance with state and
federal civil rights legislation.
Id. Public policies must therefore be considered significant factors in the application of the
cy pres doctrine.
27. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967) (concurrently with the
supreme court).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 8-1.1(f) provides that "The attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries of
such dispositions for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes and it shall be
his duty to enforce the rights of such beneficiaries by appropriate proceedings in the courts."
30. Id. § 8-1.1(c).
31. Id.
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owners of any future estates.2 Thus, when a charity is faced with a
need to reallocate endowment funds, it may be required to submit
a number of multiparty petitions to various tribunals. As a result,
a comprehensive plan respecting these funds rarely could be pre-
sented to a single state judge or court.3
III. Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Act
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[to] establish ...
uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."34 This power is exercised through the current Bankruptcy
Act,35 which preempts state provisions regarding debtor-creditor
relations." Chapter XI of the Act37 provides a workable method for
modifying a debtor's entire financial structure in a single forum;38 a
32. Id. § 8-1.1(h).
33. The consolidation and removal provisions of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
in no way obviate the need for multiple petitions. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 325 (McKinney 1972);
Id. § 5602 (McKinney 1976). In any event, consolidation is discretionary and not mandatory.
Id. § 602.
34. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
36. See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 0.02 (14th ed. 1974).
37. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970). Proceedings under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act are
directed toward formulating an arrangement under which the creditors voluntarily release the
debtor in exchange for a portion of the sums actually owed them. The benefits to the debtor
of such an arrangement are obvious; it maintains operations and avoids the complete liquida-
tion of assets which is a necessary condition to relief under the so-called "straight bank-
ruptcy" provisions of the Act. Id. §§ 1-112 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). Similarly, a
Chapter XI arrangement is often more beneficial to creditors. While they receive only a
portion of sums actually owed them, a Chapter XI plan will often yield a higher return than
liquidation; in addition, creditors will usually derive future business from the reorganized
debtor. See LEVIN AND WEINTRAUB, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 3
(1975).
It should be noted that all provisions of the Bankruptcy Act pertaining to stays of creditor
actions against the debtor apply to Chapter XI cases. See BANKR. R. 11-44(a). Proposed
arrangements must be accepted by a majority of creditors (or where creditors are classified,
a majority of each class), holding a majority in amount of all claims. 11 U.S.C. § 762 (1970).
Upon acceptance and subsequent confirmation of the plan by the court, the case is dismissed,
Id. § 767; but upon the debtor's failure to comply with the terms of the plan, the court may
adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt and order liquidation of the debtor's assets. Id. § 277;
BANKR. R. 11-42(b).
Chapter XI is essentially a "relief and rehabilitation statute. It is founded upon the princi-
ple that preservation of a business is good for the national economy and that its liquidation
is not." Herzog, Mechanics of Chapter XI, in PROCEEDINGS OF SEMINAR FOR NEWLY APPOINTED
REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY 283 (1964).
38. Chapter XI has generally been recognized as a more successful reorganization scheme
than Chapter X, which deals strictly with corporate reorganization. One authority notes:
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charitable entity39 seeking to maintain operations would seek relief
under this Chapter.
A. Jurisdiction Over the Debtor's Assets
Upon the filing of a Chapter XI petition, the bankruptcy court in
which the petition is filed obtains exclusive jurisdiction over the
debtor and his assets, wherever located." Once a trustee has been
appointed and qualified," he is vested by operation of law with the
debtor's title to all nonexempt property.2 Exemptions are normally
determined by reference to state law,43 unless state law impairs the
[A] practical evaluation suggests greater benefits by a composition or extension under
Chapter XI than the doubtful values under Chapter X of a long proceeding, new
management getting on-the-job training and new interests acquiring control of the
business.
LEVIN AND WEINTRAUB, PRACTICAL GUIDES TO CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 4 (1975).
39. Cursory inspection of the Act might yield the conclusion that charitable corporations
are not covered by its provisions; yet this is clearly not the case. 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970)
applies to all "persons," with specified exclusions. No exception is made for charitable corpo-
rations or trusts. The word "persons," as defined by the Act, clearly embrace a charitable
entity:
"Persons" shall include corporations, except where otherwise specified, and officers,
partnerships, and women, and when used with reference to the commission of acts
which are forbidden under this title shall include persons who are participants in the
forbidden acts, and the agents, officers, and members of the board of directors or
trustees or of other similar controlling bodies of corporations.
Id. § 1(23).
40. Id. § 110(a).
41. In Chapter XI proceedings, the court may decline to appoint a trustee and permit the
debtor to remain in possession of his property and to have all the title and exercise all the
powers of a duly-appointed trustee. Id. § 742. The debtor in possession is at all times subject
to the control of the bankruptcy court. Id. He may be required to furnish a bond or other
security. BANKR. R. 11-20(a), 11-20(f). For the advantages of allowing the debtor to continue
in possession, see note 38 supra. In the United States District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York, the customary practice is to allow the debtor to continue in
possession and operate his business. However, receivers are appointed in other districts. See
LEVIN AND WEINTRAUB, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 5 (1975).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1970).
43. The Act describes the assets of the bankrupt's estate to which the trustee takes title.
Id. § 110(a). In its most general statement, this section provides that the trustee is vested
with the bankrupt's title to "property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of
the petition he could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded or sequestered
.... "Id. § 110(a)(5).
The question of what property the debtor could transfer is usually determined by reference
to state law. Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U.S. 296t 303 (1904). But cf. Chicago Board
of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924). See generally Countryman, The Use of State Law
in Bankruptcy Cases, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407 (1972).
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efficacy of the bankruptcy power." In evaluating the bankruptcy
court's power to grant cy pres relief, two issues must be confronted:
(1) when, under state law, does a gift actually vest in the charitable
organization; and (2) does the trustee in bankruptcy take title to
trust assets?
In New York, assets left in trust for the use of a charitable cor-
poration are deemed to be the outright property of the corporation;
the corporation holds the property on its own behalf and not as
trustee. The New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law provides: 5
A corporation .. .classified as a Type B corporation shall hold full owner-
ship rights in any assets consisting of funds or other real or personal property
of any kind, that may be given, granted, bequeathed or devised to or other-
wise vested in such corporation in trust for, or with a direction to apply the
same to, any purpose specified in its certificate of corporation, and shall not
be deemed a trustee of an express trust of such assets. Any other corporation
subject to this chapter may similarly hold assets so received, unless otherwise
provided by law or in the certificate of incorporation.
This provision codifies the rule of Saint Joseph's Hospital v.
Bennet," in which the New York Court of Appeals held that prop-
erty transferred to a charity upon condition or in trust actually vests
in the charity. The basis for the holding in Saint Joseph's was the
common law doctrine that an entity may not be the trustee of a fund
for its own benefit; 7 such mergers of legal and beneficial interest
have been consistently held to defeat the existence of a trust. 8 Since
property given in trust or upon condition is deemed vested in a
charitable corporation, the bankruptcy court could exercise jurisdic-
tion over it when the corporation presents itself in the posture of a
Chapter XI debtor.
If a charitable corporation holds property as a trustee for another
beneficiary, the trustee in bankruptcy will normally take title to
such trust assets, subject of course to the outstanding interest of the
beneficiaries. 9 However, "[w]hen it appears that the bankrupt [or
44. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
45. N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 513(a) (McKinney 1970).
46. 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939).
47. Id. at 120, 22 N.E.2d at 307, citing Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 450, 458 (1873).
48. See Reed v. Browne, 295 N.Y. 184, 188, 66 N.E.2d 47,,49 (1946); Rose v. Hatch, 125
N.Y. 427, 26 N.E. 467 (1891); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 99(5) (1959).
49. 4A COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY $ 70.25 (14th ed. 1976).
[Vol. V
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debtor] was only a trustee and had no beneficial interest in or claim
against the property, . . . the court should turn the property over to
its true owners when possible."5
A different situation exists where the charitable debtor is the
beneficiary of trust property held by a separate trustee. Under state
law, the property has vested in the trustee, and the debtor has no
legal title to it;' however, the debtor does have some interest in and
rights to the property, over which the bankruptcy court might take
jurisdiction:5
The rule is that where property is held in trust for one who becomes bank-
rupt, the bankruptcy trustee, upon his appointment, becomes vested with
any interest in the trust estate or fund the bankrupt had, provided that at
the time of the filing of the petition such interest was under § 70(a)(5)[11
U.S.C. § 110(a)(5)] capable of being assigned or transferred by the bankrupt
or was subject to attachment, seizure or judicial sale.
Whether an interest was assignable or transferable at the time the
petition was filed is generally determined by the law of the state
where the trust has its situs.53
Where a charitable debtor is the sole possible income beneficiary
of a charitable trust, an argument might be advanced that the cor-
pus of the trust is in reality property of the debtor and that the
trustee occupies the same position as the directors of the
corporation. Judicial adoption of such a view might permit the
bankruptcy court to exercise jurisdiction over the trust corpus,
rather than merely over the debtor's rights to receive income from
the trust.
However, it should be noted that not all trusts are subject to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. "If the trust is created so as to be
inalienable by the [beneficiary] . . . the trustee in bankruptcy
generally takes nothing."5 Thus, the trustee is not entitled to reach
the bankrupt beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust,55 if such
50. Id. at 340-41.
51. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
52. 4A COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.26 (14th ed. 1976). See also Thumess v. Von Hoffman,
109 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1940); Suskin & Berry, Inc. v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1930);
Sommers v. Timely Toys, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); In re Skodnick, 91 F. Supp.
529 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Brown v. Barker, 68 App. Div. 592, 74 N.Y.S. 43 (4th Dept. 1902).
53. See 4A COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.26 (14th ed. 1976).
54. Id.
55. Danning v. Lederer, 232 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1956); Ashton v. Sentney, 145 F.2d 719
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trust is valid according to applicable state trust law.56
B. Federal Judicial Authority To Exercise Cy Pres Powers
Once the bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction over a specific
trust interest, the question remains whether it may conduct a cy
pres proceeding and modify the conditions upon which the property
is held. While the cy pres power has been said to be an inherent
power of all courts of equity,57 this alone cannot be conclusive on the
issue of the bankruptcy court's capacity to modify trusts." In New
York, jurisdiction over testamentary trusts is by statute vested in
the surrogate's court,59 while inter vivos trusts are administered by
the supreme court; 0 yet this grant of jurisdiction to the New York
courts cannot determine the jurisdiction of courts of bankruptcy.
Even though New York law would likely be applied by the bank-
(9th Cir. 1944); Jones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied sub nom. Jules v.
Ready, 270 U.S. 652 (1926).
56. New York provides by statute that all trusts to receive the rents and profits from real
property or the income from personal property are spendthrift in nature. N.Y. EST., POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5(a)(1) (McKinney 1967). However, the creator may provide for the
transferability or assignability of income in the instrument creating the trust. Id.
57. See Fontain v. Ravenal, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 386 (1854); 4 Scorr ON TRUSTS § 399
(3d ed. 1967).
58. Section 2(a) of the Bankruptcy Act indicates that the bankruptcy court has jurisdic-
tion both in law and in equity. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970). The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged this fact, stating that the bankruptcy court is "essentially [a court] of equity, and
[itsj proceedings [are] inherently proceedings in equity." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 240 (1934). Furthermore the court has noted that "[p]roceedings in bankruptcy gener-
ally are in the nature of proceedings in equity. ... Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S.
524, 535 (1900). See also In re Lahongrais, 5 F.2d 899, 901 (lst Cir. 1925); In re Rochford, 124
F. 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1903); Swarts v. Siegal, 117 F. 13, 16 (8th Cir. 1902); Guariglia v.
Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 382 F. Supp. 758, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afi'd, 516 F. 2d
896 (2d Cir. 1975); Inland Security Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 349 (W.D.
Mo. 1974); In re Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 F. 549, 553 (W.D. Mo. 1910).
59. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967). This jurisidction is
exercised concurrently with the supreme court. Id.
Federal courts are said to have no jurisdiction in matters of probate; this stems in part from
the common law treatment of decedents' estates. Probate matters were not considered mat-
ters of "law" or "equity" at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, and were tradi-
tionally in the province of the English ecclesiastical courts. In re Broderick's Will, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 503, 509-10 (1874). However, since cy pres in many states is not solely a function
of probate courts, it would be unreasonable to deny summarily the power ot federal courts to
act upon funds created by will as opposed to those created by inter vivos agreement.
60. N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967).
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ruptcy court in applying cy pres relief,6 a federal court could hardly
look to state law in order to establish its own jurisdiction.
Federal courts presented with applications for cy pres relief have
reached different conclusions regarding both their authority to grant
such relief and the proper body of law to be used in making such a
determination.
The foremost case, Pennsylvania v. Brown,"2 was an action
brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.3 Plaintiffs sought
to eliminate racial restrictions governing admission to Philadel-
phia's Girard College, a charitable educational institution estab-
lished and maintained by a testamentary trust. Referring to Penn-
sylvania law, the district court held that it had pendent jurisdiction
of the plaintiff's state claim and could exercise cy pres power over
the trust: 1
Judicial cy pres is part of the "regular and inherent jurisdiction [of] a court
of equity in relation to trusts .... ." If [the complaint] were to state a valid
cy pres claim-and on what we presently intimate no view-this court would
have jurisdiction to grant relief.
While this result has not been seriously attacked, the cases upon
which the court relied for its holding do not form the strong prece-
dential underpinning suggested by the firmness of the court's lan-
guage. Two of the cases relied on in Brown were mid-nineteenth
century decisions of the Supreme Court-Fontain v. Ravenel"5 and
61. Since the interpretation of wills and trusts and the resultant discernment of the
donor's intent is largely a function of state law, a federal court would undoubtedly look to
state law for decisional precedents. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 437, 444 (1970) (noting
that the construction of wills is essentially a state question and that the determination of
whether to apply the doctrine of cy pres is traditionally a state function).
It may well be that state law looks solely to the conscience of the court on the issue of cy
pres. But since the creation and governance of trusts is so generally a creature of state law,
it might be appropriate to look to that source. Such a decision would be sensibly grounded
in the principles of comity underlying Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383,
392-98 (1964). Examination of the tenth amendment to the Constitution suggests a similar
view. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
62. 260 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1966), vacated in part on other grounds, 373 F.2d 771 (3d
Cir. 1967).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
64. 260 F. Supp. at 337.
65. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854).
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Vidal v. Girard's Executors-while third case, Smith v. Moore, 7
was decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1965.
Vidal v. Girard's Executors" involved the same trust before the
court in Brown. The testator bequeathed a fund to the City of Phila-
delphia to establish a school for indigent male youths. Plaintiffs
attacked the validity of the trust, claiming that the law could not
recognize trusts established for the benefit of an indefinite class of
beneficiaries. 9 The critical issue before the court was whether the
repeal of the English Statute of Charitable Uses,7" which had been
repealed in Pennsylvania, divested the courts of that state of cy pres
powers. One Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision seemed to indi-
cate that it had, at least with respect to "prerogative" iy pres.7' Mr.
Justice Story, writing for the Court, examined the statute's history
and noted that prerogative cy pres powers-used to cure flaw in
charitable trusts-had been exercised by English Courts of Chan-
cery long before and independent of the statute.72 He concluded that
the statute merely codified the common law concept of cy pres and
that the repeal did not affect the court's power to remove abhorrent
trust provisions. To this extent, he indicated that cy pres was an
inherent power of courts of equity.7"
The bequest in Fontain v. Ravenel7l involved a life estate, with a
remainder to be paid over "[to] such charitable institutions in
Pennsylvania . . .as [my executors] may deem most beneficial to
mankind . . . .." The executors failed to exercise their power of
appointment over the fund, and the holder of the life estate (the last
surviving executrix) made no reference to the power in her will. The
Attorney General of Pennsylvania petitioned a federal court to
apply the cy pres doctrine in order to maintain the charitable pur-
66. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844).
67. 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965).
68. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
69. While the beneficiaries of a trust must be identified with reasonable certainty, an
opposite rule obtains in the case of charitable trusts. Such trusts are said to be for the benefit
of all mankind, and so the beneficiaries must be an identifiable class of persons. In re
Syracuse Univ., 3 N.Y.2d 665, 148 N.E.2d 671, 171 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1958).
70. 43 Eliz. I, c. 2 (1601).
71. Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watts (Pa.) 218 (1833).
72. 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 196.
73. Id.
74. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 269 (1854).
75. Id. at 382.
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pose of the gift. The Supreme Court, in denying the requested rem-
edy on appeal, reached a conclusion seemingly contradictory to its
earlier decision in Vidal.7" But the court foundered on the distinc-
tion between cy pres as a judicial power and cy pres as a prerogative
function of the Chancellor:"
The courts of the United States cannot exercise any equity powers, except
those conferred by acts of congress, and those judicial powers which the high
court of chancery in England, acting under its judicial capacity as a court of
equity, possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Powers not judicial, exercised by the chancellor
merely as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king's
prerogative as parens patriae are not possessed by the circuit courts.
Noting that "[c]hancery will not compel the execution of a mere
naked power,""8 the court held the bequest to be unenforceable; to
carry out the testator's charitable intent would require the exercise
of prerogative cy pres, which was not within the ambit of ordinary
and inherent equity powers.79 In reaching its decision, the court also
considered Pennsylvania state law, which denied the existence of
the cy pres doctrine in that state. 0
Two concurring opinions in Fontain further confuse the jurisdic-
tional issue. Mr. Chief Justice Taney was of the opinion that state
law should not have been consulted, since it could only increase the
authority of federal court within the boundaries of that state's judi-
cial power.8 By this reasoning, prerogative cy pres, if available as a
remedy, belonged to the state as a sovereign entity, and no state
could confer its executive power on the federal judiciary. Mr. Justice
Daniel, in his concurrence, expressed the view that jurisdiction to
administer cy pres relief was inherent in the equitable jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 2 Yet he concurred in the majority opinion for
76. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra. It should be noted that the Court in Fontain
did not reach the issue of whether the federal courts could exercise cy pres functions which
were traditionally considered judicial in nature.
77. 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 384.
78. Id. at 385.
79. Id. at 389.
80. In Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watts (Pa.) 218 (1833), the court held that
the English Statute of Charitable Uses, of which the doctrine of cy pres is a function, did
not codify the common law with the result that the blanket repeal of English statutes in
Pennsylvania left the doctrine without force there.
81. 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 391 (Taney, C.J., concurring).
82. Id. at 396 (Daniel, J., concurring).
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the reason that a naked power does not create an enforceable trust. 3
In Smith v. Moore,8 the district court was faced with a bequest
made for the purpose of constructing a hospital. However, the
amount of the gift was insufficient for that purpose. The court,
whose jurisdiction over the parties was based on diversity of citizen-
ship, assessed its power to administer cy pres by looking to the law
of the state in which it sat. The court concluded that the state would
avoid frustration of the bequest by granting cy pres relief: 5
Once having determined the validity of the trusts and the application of cy
pres, it is the opinion of this court that the state court, on appropriate peti-
tion by the fiduciary, should resolve the remaining issues and allocate the
trusts under cy pres [since] [s]uch action would permit parties in interest
to be heard.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision."' Without exploring the question of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court directed the trustees to divert the funds to the
creation of a wing for an already existing hospital.81
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals employed an analysis
based on the doctrine of "equitable approximation. ' 8 The distinc-
tion between this novel "doctrine" and judicial cy pres in the con-
text of a charitable trust is thus not easy to comprehend. Neverthe-
less, to the court of appeals, the distinction was vital.
Reference was first made to the Virginia rules concerning cy pres
and it was stated that it "is in the main stream of the confusion,
contradiction and equivocation attaching to the history of the doc-
trine. 8s9 The court then avoided this morass by seizing on the con-
cept of equitable appropriation and, without further reference to
Virginia law, this concept was found to be inherent in courts of
equity and applied to the case at bar. Although the proper body of
decisional authority was never identified, the court's reference to
the Virginia law of cy pres supports the contention that it considered
itself bound by state law. 0
83. Id. at 398. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
84. 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965).
85. 225 F. Supp. 434, 449 (E.D. Va. 1963).
86. 343 F.2d 594, 604 (4th Cir. 1965).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 602.
89. Id. at 599.
90. Id. at 604.
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An approximation of prerogative cy pres had developed in federal
courts with respect to racial and religious discrimination in charita-
ble trusts. Courts using a "state action" rationale9 have excised
discriminatory trust features on the grounds that they violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." One com-
mentator has noted:9 3
The state action concept is not wielded sparingly; peripheral governmental
involvement is often enough to necessitate the dismantling of exclusionary
trust instructions. Generally, the trust property will then be preserved for
charitable purposes through application of the doctrines of cy pres or devia-
tion, unless the testator has unmistakably manifested an intention that a
gift-over or lapse occur in the event the discrimination is disallowed.
Two modes of state action have been articulated with respect to
trusts: first, judicial state action, based on the actions of the judici-
ary in enforcing a discriminatory trust; 4 and second, a
"significance" test, determined by evaluating the extent of obvious
state participation" in the operation of a discriminatory trust.
Exclusionary trust provisions may be stricken from a charitable
trust when either form of state action is found, but all nondiscrimi-
natory features of the trust remain in operation.
Pennsylvania v. Brown" furnishes a prime example of discrimina-
tory trust modification. The trust in that case provided for the es-
tablishment of a school for white males. 7 Seven blacks brought suit
91. Racially discriminatory provisions in a trust are almost invariably invalidated and
rendered inoperative. However, provisions which discriminate in favor of religious groups may
be allowed to stand under certain circumstances.
Trusts directly in support of religion, such as a fund to maintain a parish church, are
unanimously accepted as charitable and apparently immune from constitutional attack. On
the other hand, when religious restrictions are affixed to a trust providing a service or benefit
ordinarily available to the general public, the fourteenth amendment may be offended.
Adams, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Charitable Trusts: A Current Analysis of
Constitutional and Trust Law Solutions, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 20 (1976).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
93. Adams, supra note 91, at 1.
94. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
95. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See also Nelkin, Cy
Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating Look at Very Private Schools and
Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 2722 (1967).
96. 260 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1966), vacated in part and remanded, 373 F.2d 771 (3d
Cir. 1967), 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 921 (1968).
97. 392 F.2d at 120.
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seeking admission to the school and asking the district court to
remove the racial restrictions by imposing cy pres modification on
the trust." The district court deferred consideration of the cy pres
claim, although indicating that it had authority to impose cy pres."
On appeal from a later remand, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found that state court enforcement' 0 of the exclusionary
trust provisions constituted judicial and significant state action in
contravention of the fourteenth amendment, and ordered elimina-
tion of the exclusionary trust features.'
Thus, two grounds for federal exercise of cy pres may be articu-
lated. Some courts have recognized the power as inherent in a court
of equity; civil rights decisions have indicated that federal courts
may alter trusts afflicted with discriminatory state action. It should
be noted that excising discriminatory trust provisions on the basis
of prerogative cy pres may require the court to consider its authority
to administer judicial cy pres.
C. The Bankruptcy Court, Cy Pres, and Public Policy
Considerations
Although the cases do not enunciate a clear and consistent ration-
ale for the assumption of such jurisdiction, some federal courts have
acknowledged cy pres as one of their inherent equity powers. 0 In
addition, they have of their own authority modified exclusionary
trust provisions. 03 While the states and their judiciaries are said to
have a special interest in the administration of trust properties lo-
cated within their borders, 04 this interest may not be violated so
98. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 373 F.2d '771 (3d Cir. 1968).
99. 260 F. Supp 323, 357-58 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
100. The racially discriminatory provisions of the trust had been invalidated more than
a decade earlier by the Supreme Court. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230
(1957). The Court found state action in the fact that the trust executors were city officials
and held that the trust violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Id. at
231. On remand the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not remove the exclusionary provisions
from the trust, but instead referred the matter to the Orphan's Court of the County of Phila-
delphia which removed the municipal executors and replaced them with private citizens. 392
F.2d at 122-23. On appeal, the actions of the Pennsylvania courts in enforcing the discrimina-
tory trust were held to be judicial and significant "state action." 392 F.2d at 125.
101. 392 F.2d at 125.
102. See text accompanying notes 62-85 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 86-96. supra.
104. See Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381 (1933).
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long as the federal courts apply state trust law.' However, before
the bankruptcy court may be permitted to employ cy pres as an
instrument of reorganization, some policy problems must be consid-
ered.
Alteration of trust terms by the bankruptcy court may be viewed
be some as subverting the purposes of charitable trusts. Such trusts
are created in order to benefit indigent or needy individuals; but in
a reorganization the bankruptcy court's prime concerns are to apply
the debtor's assets for the optimum benefit of creditors.' There is
perhaps justified fear that in a Chapter XI proceeding the interests
of the trust beneficiaries might be subordinated to creditor de-
mands. However, two countervailing factors exist. First, the cy pres
doctrine may not be applied unless the terms of the trust have
become impossible or impractical to enforce. Absent alteration of
the trust, the charitable nature of the gift (and the creator's inten-
tion) may be lost, along with the general charitable intent of the
donor. Thus, trust law provides a check on unbridled application of
the cy pres doctrine. Secondly, a failure of a Chapter XI debtor to
propose a plan of composition acceptable to his creditors may result
in a court ordered liquidation of the debtor's operations. 7 From a
policy standpoint, the continued existence of a hospital, orphanage,
or similar institution is of greater public benefit than the elimina-
tion of such facilities or shifting their burdens to municipal agen-
cies.
Judicial economy is a second consideration supporting the use of
cy pres by bankruptcy courts. At present, a charitable corporation
may find it difficult to present a comprehensive plan for the shifting
of restricted trust funds to any single forum. Allowing the bank-
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965), where a federal district
court applied state law in determining whether the cy pres doctrine should be applied to a
Virginia trust.
106. One authority noted that:
Chapter XI gives an honest debtor the opportunity to restudy his problems and a
second chance to remedy his difficulties so that his business man can be put on a sound
financial basis. For the creditor, it means that a higher dividend may be possible....
LEVIN AND WEINTRAUB, PRAcTIcAL GUIDE TO CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY AcT 3 (1975).
However, it should be remembered that if a creditor's demands are not met, the bankruptcy
court can and will order liquidation of the debtor's assets. 11 U.S.C. § 277 (1970); BANKR. R.
11-42(b).
107. See note 101 supra.
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ruptcy court to modify an entire endowment would achieve two
advantages-first, there would be an obvious saving of time and
expense to the judicial system, the trustee, and the debtor's estate;
and second, the bankruptcy court, in deciding in what fashion each
component of the endowment should be altered, would do so with a
view toward developing a comprehensive plan of reorganization.
IV. Conclusion
Despite the absence of direct statutory authority or clear judicial
precedent, it would appear that a federal bankruptcy court may
administer cy pres relief. Of course, the court must satisfy the other
elements of its jurisdiction before this authority may become opera-
tive. But once a charitable organization comes under the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction, judicial cy pres seems a reasonable
weapon to find in the arsenal of equity.
Restructuring a debtor's financial posture with the aid of endow-
ment funds is likely to benefit all parties concerned. By completing
a full-scale reorganization in a single forum, significant savings of
time and expense will be achieved, and much needed institutions
will not be forced to close, causing hardships to those who rely on
them and subverting the intent of those who supported them. In
addition, by affording more comprehensive relief, the bankruptcy
court will enhance the success and efficacy of Chapter XI reorgani-
zations, and encourage financially distressed charities to reform
their operations at an earlier stage. Assuming jurisdiction over char-
itable trusts would entail considerable work for the bankruptcy
court; but under the right circumstances the potential for social
good may more than justify the added labor.
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